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HAY l:lAFLERS ETC. UNION

In Bank.

Dec.

[45 C.2d

1955.]

JOHN OOSTEN.
v. HAY HAULERS DAIRY
EMPI.. OYEES AND HELPERS UNION, etc., et al.,
Defendants: KNUDSEN CREAMERY COMPANY OF

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

Contracts-Perfonnance--Impossibility.-Impossibility of performance of a contract is a defense, and the burden of establishing it rests on defendant.
Id.-Perfonnance-Impossibility.-"Impossibility," as excuse
for nonperformance of a contract, is not only strict impossibility but includes impracticability because of extreme and
unreasonable difficulty, expense, injury or loss involved.
Id.-Performance--Impossibility.-Temporary impossibility of
the character which, if it should become permanent, would
discharge a promisor's entire contractual duty operates as a
pennanent discharge if performance after the impossibility
ceases would impose a substantially greater burden on the
promisor; otherwise the duty is suspended while the impossibility exists.
Id.-Performance--Impossibility.-No contractor is excused
from performance under an express provision in the contract
dispensing with performance when "causes are beyond the
control" of the contractor unless he shows affirmatively that
his failure to perform was proximately caused by a contingency within its terms: that in spite of skill, diligence and
good faith on his part, performance became impossible or
unreasonably
Id.-Performance-Impossibility.-In an action by a milk
producer against a creamery for breach of a milk purchase
agreement providing that no liability should arise if
labor trouble which ·'directly or indirectly" involved either
party rendered performance impossible, the trial court was
justified in concluding that the creamery was not prevented by
impossibility from perfonning the contract because of instructions by a union, with which the creamery had a collective
bargaining agreement, that its members were not to handle the
producer's milk because it had been labeled "unfair" or "hot"
by another union, where there was no evidence that the union
first mentioned would call a strike if the milk was received
by the creamery, where the creamery had not told its em-

[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Contracts, § 238 et seq.; Am.Jur., Contracts,
§ 380.
McK. Dig. References: [1-5] Contracts, §234; [6] Trial, §27;
17] Sales, § 43; r8J Sales. § 384; [9] Sales, § 379.
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would be
if they refused to
milk, and where the union in its collecthat there would be no strike
tive
during
the agrPement.
f6] Trial-Remarks of Judge.-In an action by a milk producer
a creamery for breach of a milk purchase agreement
that no liability should arise if labor troublt•
nn•nn·e~., or indirectly" involved either party rendered
there was not prejudging by the
trial court of the creamery's employees who testified that they
would not have handled the milk because of instructions of
the union with which the creamery had a collective bargaining
agreem2nt, where the judge merely remarked that it would take
an employee of courage to testify otherwise in the presence
of agents of the union and that "as far as the weight of the
evidence goes I think it is not as strong as it might be."
[7] Sales-Breach of Contract-Cause.-Where defendant creamery breached its agreement to purchase milk from plaintiff,
but plaintiffs, in spite of a labor dispute with a union, delivered the milk and endeavored to have defendant accept it,
the damages were caused by defendant's refusal to accept the
milk rather than plaintiff's labor dispute.
[8] Id.- Damages for Nonacceptance- Mitigation.-Where defendant creamery breached its agreement to purchase milk
from plaintiff, whose herd of cows inevitably produced milk
daily, he should not be required to get rid of his herd to stop
production; hence Civ. Code, § 1784, sub d. ( 4), relating to
mitigation, can have no application in estimating the damages
for the breach.
[9] !d.-Damages for Nonacceptance-Measure.-In an action by
a milk producer against a creamery for breach of a milk purchase agreement, the difference between the price another
creamery company paid for the milk and that specified in the
contract was a proper measure of damages for the breach,
where that company, in view of plaintiff's dispute with a union,
was the only one which would accept plaintiff's milk, but which,
in view of the fact that it had no market for Class I milk,
paid plaintiff at the rate for a lower class of milk, and where
defendant creamery had no legal excuse for its refusal to accept the milk.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Frederick F. Houser, Judge. Affirmed.
Action by a milk producer against labor unions and a
creamery for injunctive relief, damages and for breach of
(:ontract. Judgment against defendant creamery for breach
of contract, affirmed.
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Vaughan, Brandlin & Wehrle, Vaughan &
Vaughan and Richard I. Roemer for Appellant.

J. R.
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Russell E. Parsons and John Van Aalst for Respondent.
Bronson, Bronson & McKinnon, A. F. Mather, Charles A.
Rummel, Joseph
and John H. Painter as Amici
Curiae on behalf of Respondent.
CAR'l'ER, J.-Plaintiff, a
farmer, producer and seller
of milk, recovered damages in the sum of $20,314.19 against
defendant, Knudsen Creamery Company (hereinafter referred
to as defendant), engaged in the business of processing and
selling milk, for breach of contract, in an action against defendant and several unions and their officers. Judgment was
for the unions denying plaintiff damages or an injunction
against them. Defendant appeals; plaintiff has not appealed.
Plaintiff entered into a contract to supply milk to defendant Knudsen Creamery Company, and this contract was in
effect between August 6, 1951, and March 15, 1952. Under
this contract defendant agreed to purchase milk produced by
plaintiff during this period. Clause 12 of the contract provided: "In case of strike, lockout, or other labor trouble
(whether the parties hereto are directly or indirectly involved)
... which shall render it impossible for Seller to deliver, or
buyer to handle or dispose of such milk, no liability for noncompliance with this agreement caused thereby during the
time of continuance thereof shall exist or arise with respect to
either party hereto." (Emphasis added.)
According to the findings of the trial court, between August
6, 1951, and March 15, 1952, defendants Hay Haulers, Dairy
Employees and Helpers Union, Local Union Number 737,
associated with A. F. of L., and Plant and Clerical Dairy
Employees, Local 93, were labor unions, and that Dairy Employees Union Local 17, associated with the Christian Labor
Association, not a party, was also a union; that some time
prior to August 6, 1951, defendant unions were having a labor
dispute with plaintiff and declared a boycott against and
picketed plaintiff's place of business; that the picketing activity was stopped by a restraining order issued by the court;
that defendant breached the contract in refusing to take plaintiff's milk from August 6, 1951, to March 15, 1952, when plaintiff sold his dairy herd; and that as a result, plaintiff suffered
refusing to accept the milk was a claimed impossibility of perthe damage above mentioned. Defendant's only reason for
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formance under clause 12 of the contract, S1tpra. 'l'he court
found that defendant did not ''prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that it was impossible for it to handle or dispose''
of plaintiff's milk within the meaning and "proper interpretation'' of clause 12.
Defendant contends that the evidence all shows that it was
excused from
the milk under clause 12 because of
the refusal of its employees to handle it due to the labor dispute between
and Local 737; that plaintiff's failure to
dispose of his milk at the prevailing market prices was caused
by his dispute with the unions rather than a breach by defendant of the contract.
The evidence shows that in July, 1951, plaintiff had nine
employees. He was then asked by the defendant unions to
sign a collective bargaining agreement by which they would
represent his employees. He refused to sign, asserting that
his employees did not want to join the unions. He was advised
the unions that unless he signed, his place of business would
be picketed. On July 27, 1951, he signed a collective bargaining agreement with Local 17 and in that connection the court
found he took a leading part in inducing his employees to join
that union. Picketing of plaintiff's place of business by defendant unions was commenced on August 6, 1951. A defendant union representative told defendant's employees, but not
defendant, that a dispute rxisted with plaintiff and they did
not have to handle plaintiff's mille Plaintiff hauled his milk
to defendant's receiving point. Nygaard, defendant's foreman of unloading operations. refused to take the milk and
called two of defendant's supervisory employees, and the foreman's request of the unloading employee, Lorge, that he unload the milk was refused on the grounds that it was "unfair''
milk, because of the dispute between plaintiff and defendant
unions.* Plaintiff disposed of his milk elsewhere. Plaintiff
commenced the instant action, and having obtained a restraining order against defendant unions, the picketing stopped.
Several other attempts were made by plaintiff to deliver milk
to defendant including the following: In September, 1951.
he attempted to deliver his milk to defendant the same as
before. Defendant's supervisory employees were present and
the employee in charge of the unloading operation was given
a copy of tre restraining order but said he would not handle
the milk and defendant's foreman said they could do nothing
*The unloading was done by defendant's employee pumping it from
plaintiff's truck and could be done by one man.
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about it. About two weeks later a similar
under similar circumstances was made with similar results, with the
addition that a new restraining order had been obtained
which ordered defendant's employees to handle plaintiff's
milk. Plaintiff testified that none of defendant's supervisory
employees who were present, except foreman Nygaard, ordered
Lorge or anyone else to unload the milk when plaintiff attempted to make the various deliveries; however, there is
evidence that one of such supervisory employees gave such
order. After Lorge had refused to unload the milk, defendant's
supervisory employees said there was nothing they could do
about it. On August 28, 1951, plaintiff wrote to defendant
regarding its refusal to accept the milk, stating that he had
obtained an injunction against the picketing and demanded
that defendant comply with the contract.
There is evidence that r_~oeal 93 with whom defendant had
a collective bargaining agreement covering its employees advised defendant that plaintiff's milk was "hot" and the employees under the bargaining agreement did not have to handle
it and could not be fired for refusing to do so ; that the restraining order obtained by plaintiff did not change the situation;
that an exempt employee of defendant, a supervisory employee, could not unload the milk. In a similar ease a year
before, I_~ocal 93 had informed defendant that if any of its
employees were fired or discharged for refusing to handle
"hot" milk, the plant would be shut down. Defendant called
a large number of its employees as witnesses, and they testified
that they would have refused and would still refuse to handle
plaintiff's milk under the circumstances, and it was stipulated
that the rest of its employees would testify to the same effect.
[1] Impossibility of performance is a defense and the
burden of proof in establishing it rests on defendant. (Hensler v. City of Los Angeles, 124 Oal.App.2d 71, 83 [268 P.2d
12] ; Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Sparling, 93 Oal.App.2d 768
[209 P.2d 968]; McCulloch v. Liguori, 88 Oal.App.2d 366 [199
P.2d 25]; Lloyd v. Murphy, 25 Oal.2d 48 [153 P.2d 47].)
[2] '' 'Impossibility' is defined in section 454 of the Restatement of Contracts, as not only strict impossibility but as impracticability because of extreme and unreasonable difficulty,
expense, injury, or loss involved. [3] Temporary impossibility of the character which, if it should become permanent,
would discharge a promisor's entire contractual duty, operates
as a permanent discharge if performance after the impossibility
ceases would impose a substantially greater burden upon the
promisor; otherwise the duty is suspended while the impossi-
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bility exists. (Restatement of Contracts, § 462.)" (Autry v.
Repnblic Productions, Inc., 30 Cal.2d 144, 148 [180 P.2d 888] ;
Lloyd v. Jtlnrphy, S1tpra, 25 Cal.2d 48.) In the instant
ease we construe clause 12, with respect to impossibility of
performance, the same as it is construed generally in contract
law with regard to whether the performance has been made
impossible. The only things the clause adds are that certain
things-labor dispute, strikes-may excuse performance, when
without it they might not, but the question remains whether
those things have made performance impossible. [4] As has
been said: "We can not always be sure what 'causes are
beyond the control' of the contractor. Many fires can be prevented by the use of foresight and sufficient expenditure.
Most strikes can be avoided by a judicious yielding or by an
abject surrender to demands. No contractor is excused under
such an express provision unless he shows affirmatively that
his failure to perform was proximately caused by a contingency
within its terms; that, in spite of skill, diligence and good faith
on his part, performance became impossible or unreasonably
expensive." (Corbin on Contracts, § 1342.)
[5] On the record before us the trial court was justified
in concluding, as it did, that defendant was not prevented by
impossibility from performing the contract. There was no
evidence that the union would call a strike if the milk was
received by defendant, except the inference that might be
drawn from its claim in a similar situation a year before that
it would shut down defendant's plant if defendant handled
hot milk. The trial court was not compelled to draw that inference. The court could have given little weight to the effect
on defendant's employees of the statement by the officials and
attorney of Local 93 that they, as individuals, were not required to handle hot milk or that the telling of defendant that
they would not consider it a breach of the collective bargaining
agreement between defendant and f_;ocal 93 for the employees
to refuse to handle the milk. Defendant at no time told its
employees that if they refused to handle plaintiff's milk they
would be discharged. In the bargaining agreement between
defendant and Local 93 the latter agreed that there shall be
no strike during the life of the agreement and if any controversy arose it would be settled by the negotiation procedure in
the agreement, and ultimately by arbitration, if the other
means failed. The court could infer that Local 93 would abide
by the agreement. No steps were taken to settle any controversy under the agreement. The weight of the testimony of
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defendant's employees that they would not have handled
plaintiff's milk was for the trial court.
of them knew
little about the dispute as to plaintiff's milk or what defendan1
had been doing about hot milk or the attitude of Local 93. At
most their testimony was as to what they would do, a matter
only of their mental attitude, and whether
would
refuse when confronted with the
discipline was
another matter.
in its
that defendant had not proven impossibility; indeed, it may
have concluded that defendant showed nothing more than a
vague threat of adverse action by Local 93 and the employees
(see Moore v. Whitty, 299 Pa. 58 [149 A. 93, 94] ), and that
defendant was under no pressure other than its desire not to
antagonize Local 93.
Plaintiff's counsel remarked in his opening statement that
defendant's plant would "probably be tied up" if it took
plaintiff's milk but we do not consider that as conclusive. The
trial court could still determine the case on the evidence.
There is evidence that defendant's employees would obey the
officials of Local 93, but as we have seen, it does not appear that
Local 93 would necessarily have called a strike. The collective
bargaining agreement between defendant and Local 93 provided that defendant could not ''discriminate against'' its
employee members of Local 93 for "upholding the principles
of the American Federation of Labor'' (emphasis added) but
there still was the arbitration provision and the court was not
required to find that those ''principles'' included a boycott.
Nor is the situation different because the court approved the
action of defendant's employees in refusing to handle the milk
by denying an injunction or the loss that might have been suffered by defendant if its plant was shut down because, as seen,
defendant did not establish to the satisfaction of the trial court
that such loss was imminent.
[6] Contrary to defendant's contention we do not find any
prejudging by the trial court of defendant's many employees
\\·ho testified that they would not have handled the milk. He
merely remarked that it would take an employee of courage
to testify otherwise in the presence of agents of Local 93 and
that "as far as the weight of the evidence goes I think it is
not as strong as it might be.''
It is not decisive whether a strike or a refusal of Local 93
1. o instruct its members to handle the milk or a refusal by
defendant's employees to unload the milk would be legal or
dlegal action for, as seen, the matter here turns on whether
defendant has sustained its burden of showing impossibility,
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the existence of which would excuse it from performance where
eaused by a strike or labor trouble.
Complaint is made that the damages were caused, not by
defendant's refusal to take the milk but rather by the fact
that the milk was "hot" because of plaintiff's dispute with
Local 737 which prevented him from selling it elsewhere at the
cnrrent market
; that plaintiff brought on the labor dispute with Local 737 by signing with Local 17 and discharging
an A. F. of L. employee working for him; that the evidence
shows there was a market price established under state law
for Class I milk, the kind plaintiff produced, and the contract
between them provided for such market price.
If that argument means that the cause of the contract breach
by defendant was the labor dispute in which plaintiff was involved it is nothing more than another argument on the
issue of impossibility heretofore discussed. [7] Defendant
breached the contract, but plaintiff, in spite of the labor dispute with Local 737, delivered the milk and endeavored to
have defendant accept it. Thus the damages, whatever they
may be, were caused by defendant's refusal to accept the
milk rather than plaintiff's labor dispute. Defendant's breach
not being excused, as found by the trial court, it follows that
plaintiff is entitled to any damages he suffered by reason of
defendant's refusal to buy the mille The question then arises
as to the proper measure of damages. Is the difference between the current market price of Class I milk and the price
fixed in the contract the proper measure here? Section 1784
provides: "(1) ·where the buyer wrongfully neglects or refuses to accept and pay for the goods, the seller may maintain
an action against him for damages for nonacceptance.
"(2) . . . The measure of damages is the estimated loss
directly and naturally resulting in the ordinary course of
events, from the buyer's breach of contract.
'' ( 3) Where there is an available market for the goods in
question, the measure of damages is, in the absence of special
circumstances, showing proximate damage of a greater amount,
the difference between the contract price and the market or
current price at the time or times when the goods ought to
have been accepted, or, if no time was fixed for acceptance,
then at the time of the refusal to accept.
" ( 4) (Mitigation.) If, while labor or expense of material
amount are necessary on the part of the seller to enable him to
fulfill his obligations under the contract to sell or the sale,
the buyer repudiates the contract or the sale, or notifies the
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to proceed no further therewith, the
to the seller for no greater damages than
would have
suffered if he did nothing towards carrying out the contract
or the sale after receiving notice of the buyer's repudiation or
eountermand. The profit the seller would have made if the
contract or the sale had been fully performed shall be considered in estimating such damages." (Emphasis added; Civ.
Code, § 1784.) [8] Because plaintiff had his herd of cows
and they inevitably produced milk daily, the milk was certain
to be produced and he should not be required to get rid of his
herd to stop production; therefore, subdivision 4 of section
1784 can have no application. (See O'Hare v. Peacock
Dairies, Inc., 26 Cal.App.2d 345 [79 P.2d 433].)
[9] Defendant urges that subdivision 3 is applicable and
as there were not special circumstances showing proximate
damage of a greater amount, the difference between the contract price and the market price is the measure; that the contract price and current market price were the same and plaintiff's labor dispute, which made the milk hot rather than defendant's refusal to accept it, was the proximate cause of any
additional damages suffered by him; that hence plaintiff was
entitled to no more than nominal damages. The court found
that "the only creamery company within practicable delivery
distance of plaintiff's dairy, which would accept plaintiff's
milk during the period extending from August 6, 1951, to
March 15, 1952, was the Excelsior Creamery Company . . .
that said ... Company, for the [said] period ... did accept
all of plaintiff's milk ... but said Creamery Company was
unable to use all of such milk as Class I milk by reason of
pre-existing contracts with other milk producers, but, on the
contrary could accept part of said plaintiffs' milk only as
Class II or as manufacturing milk, respectively; the Court
further finds that the prices paid milk producers by creameries, in accordance with the rules and regulations of the
Bureau of Milk Control of the State of California, for Class
II milk and for manufacturing milk, respectively, is considerably less in each case than that paid for Class I milk; the
Court further finds that the difference between that which
the plaintiff received for his milk, for the period extending
from August 6, 1951, to March 15, 1952, from Excelsior
Creamery Company and that which he would have received
from the defendant . . . had said defendant carried out the
terms of the above described contract ... by accepting all of
plaintiff's milk ... as Cla1ss I milk, totals $20,314.19." The
evidence shows plaintiff sold his milk to the Excelsior Cream-
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ery Company at Santa Ana, 20 miles from his dairy (defend·
ant's plant is in Los Angeles, 20 miles from plaintiff's dairy)
bnt Excelsior had no market for Class I milk and paid plaintiff
at the rate for a lower class of milk. Plaintiff testified that he
tried to sell it elsewhere but could not because it was considered
hot milk due to his dispute with Local 737. A witness for defendant testified that during the period for which damages
were awarded there was a market in the area for Class I milk.
While it may be that one of the causes why plaintiff could not
dispose of his milk, except to Excelsior, was the labor dispute.
it still is true that he did not have any market for it except to
Excelsior. There was no defect in the quality of the milk and
defendant had no legal excuse for its refusal to accept the milk.
The refusal of defendant and other union milk buyers to take
plaintiff's milk resulted, at least in part, because they thought
it might have some effect upon their collective bargaining
agreements with the union. Thus a proximate result of defendant's refusal to take the milk was plaintiff's inability to
find a market. Under all the circumstances the court was
justified in concluding that the only market available was
Excelsior, the company to which plaintiff sold the milk, and
the difference between the price they paid and that specified
in the contract was a proper measure of damages.
Amici curiae have filed a brief urging some of the points
heretofore discussed and further asserting that the activity
of the union defendants was a boycott, illegal under the Labor
Management Relations Act (29 U.S.C.A. § 158), and thus
easily prevented by defendant by the machinery provided in
that act, and that an illegal act by another will not support a
finding of impossibility of performance. 'rhere is nothing in
the ease to indicate that the national law is here applicable.
Hence there is no occasion to discuss the merits of this contention.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. ,J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., concurred.
EDMONDS, J.-Paragraph 12 of the contract which
governs the rights of Oosten and the dairy provides: ''In
case of strike, lockout, or other labor trouble (whether thP
parties hereto are directly or indirectly involved) . . which
shall render it impossible for Seller to deliver, or Buyer to
handle or dispose of such milk, no liability for non-compliance
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with this agreement caused thereby during the time of continuance thereof shall exist or arise with respect to either
party thereto.'' In resisting the contention that Knudsen's
performance was excused by this provision, the majority rely
upon the finding that "the defendant . . . did not prove by
a preponderance of the evidence that it was 'impossible' for
them to 'handle or dispose of' the milk of the plaintiff . . .. ''
Although the burden of proving the facts upon which the
defense of impossibility of performance rests lies with the
one claiming under the defense (Hensler v. City of Los Angeles, 124 Cal.App.2d 71, 83 [268 P.2d 12] ; Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Sparling, 93 Cal.App.2d 768, 775 [209 P.2d
968] ) , whether the facts show the excuse of impossibility is a
conclusion of law to be drawn by the court. (Mitchell v.
Ceazan Tires, Ltd., 25 Cal.2d 45, 48 [153 P.2d 53].) In
the present case, there is no substantial dispute in the evidence as to the circumstances and the conduct of the parties
in relation to them.
California follows a more liberal view than the courts of
many other jurisdictions in the application of the doctrine
of impossibility. It is not enough that performance of the
contract is made more difficult or expensive (McCulloch v.
Liguori, 88 Cal.App.2d 366, 372-373 [199 P.2d 25] and cases
cited), but performance may be excused under circumstances
showing "not only strict impossibility but . . . impracticability because of extreme and unreasonable difficulty, expense,
injury or loss involved." (Autry v. Republic Productions,
Inc., 30 Cal.2d 144, 148 [180 P.2d 888]; City of Vernon v.
City of Los Angeles, ante, p. 710 [290 P.2d 841] ; Mineral
Park Land Co. v. Howard, 172 Cal. 289, 293 [156 P. 458,
L.R.A. 1916F 1]; Rest. Contracts, § 462.)
It may be presumed that in adopting paragraph 12 of their
contract, the parties had in mind the more liberal rule as
to "impossibility" established by California law. Furthermore, the parties appear to have so qualified their use of
the term by express contemplation of the possibility of ''strike,
lockout, or other labor trouble (whether the parties hereto
are directly or indirectly involved)," contingencies which
ordinarily do not render performance impossible under strict
definitions of the term. Such a provision, even under the
strict view of impossibility followed by many courts, probably would suffice as a ''proper condition'' or ''qualification''
whereby a party might "shield" himself from impractica-
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bility of
arising from labor difficulties. (Of.
Kiyoichi Fujikawa v. Sunrise Soda Water Works, 158 F.2d
490, 493.)
Oosten was directly involved in a labor controversy with
the union which also represented the workers of Knudsen.
Because of that controversy his milk was branded as being
"unfair." Unquestionably, the refusal of Knudsen's workers
to handle the milk, was based upon the demands of the union
representatives. The testimony of the Knudsen men who
received and processed the milk establish that they refused
to handle it even in face of threats of discharge. In these
circumstances, performance of the contract would have been
impractical and unreasonably difficult.
The argument is made, however, that Knudsen should have
taken further action in an effort to coerce its employees to
handle Oosten's products. Knudsen might have discharged
its employees who refused to handle the products and then
attempted to pursue its legal remedies, if any, against the
union, which, it is said, at most made only "a vague threat
to call a strike" if the products were handled. (Of. Moore
v. Whitty, 299 Pa. 58 [149 A. 93, 94].) But the evidence
clearly shows that the employees vital to the processing of
the milk refused to handle it despite a court order, the direct
orders of the employer's representatives to handle the milk
and the threat of discharge. To require the employer to discharge its employees, with resulting losses in the handling of
the products of other suppliers, would place upon the employer the burden of sustaining additional losses without any
likelihood that it could fulfill its obligations under the Oosten
contract.
Furthermore, it is unrealistic under present day conditions to construe a clause designed to insulate the parties
to a contract from liability for nonperformance arising from
''labor trouble'' as affording protection only to the party
who ultimately establishes the justice of his position in the
controversy. Commonly, particularly in matters involving
economic pressure against persons not directly involved in
the labor dispute, the parties are thrown into the controversy
without any certainty of their ultimate legal rights. In such
a case, there is even greater reason why such person should
wish to shield himself from liability for nonperformance
occasioned by a yielding to the pressure.
For these reasons, in my opinion, reasonably construed,
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paragraph 12 of the contract excuses performance of it under
the circumstances established by the undisputed facts.
The judgment should be reversed.
Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied January
18, 1956. Schauer,
and Spence, J., were of the opinion
that the petition should be granted.

[L. A. No. 23118.

In Bank.

Dec. 23, 1955.)

CHAPMAN COLLEGE (a Corporation), Appellant, v.
RUSSELL H. WAGENER et al., Respondents.
[1] Vendor and Purchaser-Construction of Contract-Extrinsic
Evidence.-Where a college agreed to buy a large tract of
land, a portion of which was to be subdivided into lots and
resold by the college and, as they were resold, the lots were
to be released from the lien of a trust deed which was to be
given to secure the payment of the balance of the purchase
price on the original contract of sale, and where, with respect
to such unpaid balance, the promissory notes executed by the
college clearly provided that the principal and interest were
to be paid from the proceeds of the sale of lots by the college,
but it was not clear whether the "release price" payments,
or payments of a fixed per cent of the receipts from subdivision sales plus certain specified sums which the college
agreed to pay to the sellers on a designated day each month,
were to be applied solely on principal, extrinsic evidence was
properly received to aid the court in interpreting the agreement.
[2] Id.- Construction of Contract- Interest.-Findings of the
trial court, supported by evidence, that a provision of a contract for sale of land to a college declaring that all payments
should first be credited on interest was omitted from promissory notes of the college by mutual agreement of attorneys
for the parties in order to make certain that "release price"
payments, or payments of a fixed per cent of the receipts from
subdivision sales by the college plus certain specified sums,
would be credited solely on principal, that the notes were approved by the collf'ge and its attorney before they were exMcK. Dig. References: [1] Vendor and Purchaser,§ 99; [2, 6]
Vendor and Purchaser. § 104; [3] Vendor and Purchaser, § 255;
[ 4) Agency, § 194; [5] Attorneys, § 25.

